Abstract-The self-healing group key distribution with revocation can deal with the session key distribution problem for secure group communication over an unreliable wireless network, with the capability of resistance to the packet loss and the collusion attack. However, since previous self-healing group key distribution schemes are restricted to m sessions, they will be reset frequently, which leads to large power and bandwidth consumption. In order to prolong the life span of the self-healing group key distribution schemes and save energy, we propose an efficient long-lived δ-self-healing group key distribution scheme with revocation and collusion resistance capabilities for wireless sensor networks in this paper. Our proposed scheme is capable of supporting infinite sessions by updating the personal secret of group members during each session and performing a partial revocation. Compared to previous schemes under same conditions, security and performance analysis results show that our proposed scheme not only resolves the lifetime extension problem, but also achieves better security performance with lower storage and communication costs.
the large box 1, while operations performed by the group users are enclosed into the large box 2.
(1) Initialization: The GM divides the life time of the group communication into m sessions and randomly chooses m t-degree polynomials, S 1 (x), S 2 (x), …, S m (x), from F q [x] , and m group session keys, K 1 , ..., K m , from F q . Both polynomials and group session keys are independent of each other. Then, the GM allocates each user U i , U i ∈G 1 , its personal secret S i , S i ={S 1 (i), S 2 (i), …, S m (i)}, via a secure communication channel, where G 1 denotes the set of group members at the beginning of session 1. 
and computes the polynomial
And then, the GM broadcasts the following message B , but not BB j , 1≤j 1 <j<j 2 ≤m, it can obtain {Φ j (x)} (j 1 ≤j≤j 2 ), and subsequently recover lost session keys {K j } (1≤j 1 <j<j 2 ≤m) by the method described in the Group session key recovery.
B. Limitations
After studying previous self-healing group key distribution schemes carefully, we found that there are two limitations with respect to the lifetime.
(1) The lifetime of the previous self-healing group key distribution schemes is restricted to m sessions. The group communication is divided into clusters of m sessions in these schemes. When m sessions expired, the GM needs to reset the scheme by securely allocating each group member a fresh set of personal secrets before distributing a new group session key.
One straightforward solution to this problem is to redistribute a new set of personal secrets to each user via unicast and proceed as before. However, it consumes much more energy and bandwidth, especially when the communication group is large.
Another solution is to do polynomial interpolation in the exponent [1] . The GM broadcasts personal secret updating messages, and each user evolves his/her Meanings the set of all users in a communication group U U i the ith user GM the group manager n the total number of users in a communication group the maximum number of sessions and m is a positive integer m j the order of a session the maximum number of allowed revoked users and t is a positive integer t a field of order q and q is a prime larger than n F q the personal secret of U i S i K j the session key generated by the GM for the session j the broadcast message constructed by the GM for the session j BB j the set of all legitimate group members in the session j G j the set of all revoked users before or in the session j R j H(·) the entropy function of information theory the random one-way function used to compute the oneway key chain h(·)
a symmetric encryption/decryption function Figure 1 . The basic procedures in a traditional self-healing group key distribution scheme personal secret from one set of m sessions to another, thus making the scheme be long-lived. However, the involved cost of modular exponentiations may be prohibitive to resource-constrained WSNs. Moreover, there are still other two shortcomings in this solution [1, 5] . First, since the wireless network is not reliable, users without receiving a personal secret updating message can not update their personal secrets. Second, once the number of revoked users is up to t, where t is the degree of the polynomial, "re-starting" the scheme by securely sending each user a fresh personal secret is desirable even with the long-lived self-healing scheme.
In [6] , Dutta et al. tried to overcome the limited session number problem by using the one-way hash chain and encryption functions. However, Daza et al. proved that the scheme proposed in [6] is not secure at all [7] .
(2) User revocation model. In previous schemes, when joining the communication group, a user receives the personal secret for all of following sessions. In order to revoke users, the GM has to include all revoked users' IDs in the revocation polynomial, named as the "all revocation model".
Once the number of revoked users equals to t, the GM has to reset the scheme even a set of m sessions does not expire. Hence, the lifetime of the self-healing group key distribution scheme decreases.
To resolve above problems, we propose a long-lived self-healing group key distribution scheme in this paper. The main contributions of our work are (1) Our proposed scheme solves the problem of limited life span in previous schemes. By updating group members' personal secrets per session, our proposed scheme can support infinite sessions. And with a δ-sliding window mechanism, the GM only needs to consider revoked users in these δ sessions, named as the "partial revocation model".
(2) Our proposed scheme reduces the storage overhead to a constant without in the price of the increase of the communication cost.
(3) The communication cost for updating session keys and personal secrets is also reduced.
III. PROPOSED LONG-LIVED SELF-HEALING GROUP KEY DISTRIBUTION SCHEME To clarify our proposed scheme and facilitate the analysis, we first give the system model and definitions of the security model used in this paper.
A. System model
Considering a communication group in WSNs with a GM and a set of n users, U={U 1 , U 2 , …, U n }. Each group member is uniquely identified by an ID i, where i∈{1, 2, ..., n}, and n is the largest ID, and the group member is denoted as U i . Let G j be the communication group in the session j. All of the operations perform in a finite field F q , where q is a prime larger than n.
Each user U i , U i ∈U, stores a private secret S i for session j, and S i ∈F q .
For each session j, the GM sends the session key K j to group members through a broadcast message BB j . Hence, for U i ∈G j , K j is determined by B j B and S i .
B. Security model
Our proposed scheme will provide following security properties. We use H(·) to denote the entropy function of information theory in our definitions.
Definition 1 (self-healing group key distribution with t-revocation capability) The scheme is a self-healing group key distribution scheme with t revocation capability if the following conditions are true.
(a) For any user U i , U i ∈G j , K j is determined by BB j and S i . That is,
(b) No information about K j can be learned from either broadcast messages or personal secrets alone. That is,
. (6) (c) (t-revocation capability) The scheme has a trevocation capability if given any R j ⊆U, |R j |≤t, the GM constructs a broadcast BB j in order that the legitimate user That is,
Definition 2 (t-wise forward secrecy) The scheme guarantees t-wise forward secrecy if for any set C j ⊆U, |C j |≤t, and users in C j are revoked before or in session j, all users in C j cannot get information about K j even with the knowledge of group session keys before session j. That is,
Definition 3 (t-wise backward secrecy) The scheme guarantees t-wise backward secrecy if for any set D j ⊆U, |D j |≤t, and users in D j join the communication group after session j, users in D j cannot get any information about K j even with the knowledge of group session keys after session j. That is,
Definition 4 (t-wise collusion attack resistance) The scheme has t-wise collusion resistance capability if given any two disjoint sets and , 1≤j D is the set of users joining the group after session j 2 . That is,
C. Our proposed scheme Based on the security model mentioned above and the concept of the sliding-window, we propose a long-lived self-healing group key distribution scheme for unreliable WSNs. In our proposed scheme, we use S i,j to denote the personal secret of user U i in session j and U i can update its personal secret S i,j to S i,j+1 from the broadcast message BB j .
Our proposed scheme consists of five phases.
Phase 1: Initialization
Let t and δ be positive integers and δ denotes the selfhealing capability.
(1) For session j, j∈{1, 2, …, δ}, the GM first randomly chooses a group session key K j from F q .
(2) The GM randomly selects two t-degree polynomials, and , from F
Phase 2: Registration When a new user requires to join the group in session j, the GM chooses an unused unique identity ID, u, for it and distributes the session key K j for the current session and the personal secret 
And the key chain for session j,
computed with the one-way hash function h(·) and
where, h i (·) denotes applying hash operation i times. For security, the seeds of the key chain for different sessions are also different. That is, , and
where~' j R is the set of revoked users in session j′. The GM constructs the revocation polynomial as
(3) The GM broadcasts the following message
Phase 4: Group session key recovery When a non-revoked user U i receives the jth broadcast message BB j , it recovers the group session key K j via following steps.
(1) U i checks the personal secret and the group session key obtained before session j. Suppose that U i 's latest personal secret is S i,v+1 =( , ) and the latest obtained group session key is K
and , respectively. That is, Note that all users can compute A j (x) from R j in BB j , and consequently, evaluate A j (i). However, since A j (i)=0 for any U i , and U i ∈R j , revoked users can recover neither the masking key v j k nor the session key K j from B j B .
Phase 5: δ-Self-healing and personal secret updating
From the group session key recovery phase, we observe that our proposed scheme makes a user recover a lost group session key for any previous δ-sessions with the current broadcast message only if the user is nonrevoked in these sessions. Specifically, let U i be a legitimate group member receiving 
Remark:
The main differences between our proposed scheme and previous schemes are (1) In our proposed scheme, when joining the communication group in session j, U i receives a personal secret S i,j from the GM via a secure channel. But in previous schemes, U i receives a set of personal secrets,
(2) In our proposed scheme, U i can update its personal secret S i,j to S i,j+1 from the broadcast message B j without using modular exponentiations.
(3) Our proposed scheme uses a sliding-window mechanism, where sessions are not grouped into fixed clusters of m sessions. As time progresses, the GM broadcasts self-healing information according to a sliding window that extends δ sessions, and only needs to consider revoked users in δ sessions.
All above differences contribute to the long lifetime of our proposed scheme.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A. Security analysis
We explain that our proposed scheme is secure with following theorems and proofs. Theorem 1. The key distribution scheme proposed in the Section III is a computationally secure, self-healing group session key distribution scheme with t-revocation capability. Proof. (a) A non-revoked user U i , U i ∈G j , can recover the session key K j as described in the phase 4. Thus, it follows that H(K j |B j , S i )=0.
(b) For any non-revoked user U i , U i ∈G j , using the personal secrets only does not give any information about session keys since K j is independent of the personal secret S i,j . On the other hand, since the masking key and the session key are selected randomly, the broadcast messages cannot give any information about session keys. Therefore, K j cannot be determined only with the personal secret S i,j or the broadcast message B j . Thus, it follows that H(
(c) (t-revocation capability) Let R j be a collection of revoked users before session j, and |R j |≤t. It is impossible for the coalition of R j to recover the jth session key K j because R j has no information about 
. (d) (δ-self-healing property) Our proposed scheme has the property of δ-self-healing as described in the phase 5.
Theorem 2. The key distribution scheme proposed in the Section III achieves t-wise forward secrecy.
Proof. Let C j be the set of revoked users before session j, and |C j |≤t. With all broadcast messages {BB 1 , B 2 B , ...}, any user U r , U r ∈C j , needs to know either the jth masking key
or at least (t+1) points about polynomials ( ,
A r =0 for U r , U r ∈C j , which means that U r cannot recover the masking key
Since the number of users in C j is at most t, ( , ) cannot be determined by the coalition of users in C
j . Thus, the session key K j cannot be recovered by the revoked users. Therefore, our proposed scheme is t-wise forward secrecy. It follows that H( 
S x
Suppose that U l joins the group in session j′′ (j<j′′), the GM gives U l ( , ) as its personal secret and the j′′th session key K j . Thus, the session key K j cannot be recovered by the revoked users.
Hence, our proposed scheme is t-wise backward secrecy. It follows that H(K j |B 1 , B 2 
Theorem 4. The key distribution scheme proposed in the Section III has t-collusion resistance capability.
Proof. Let The maximum allowed number of revoked users (t)
The size of sliding window (δ )
Scheme in [2] Scheme in [3]
Our proposed scheme Hence, our proposed scheme resists to t-wise collusion attack.
It follows that Suppose that users maintain group membership during m sessions from the first session.
B. Performance comparison and analysis
For schemes in [2] and [3], the storage cost of each user is (2m+2δ-1)log 2 q bits and 3mlog 2 q bits, respectively. But for our proposed scheme, the storage cost of each user is only 3log 2 q bits, which is much less than that of previous schemes in [2] and [3]. (2) The communication cost for updating session keys
The size of the jth broadcast packet for the scheme in [2] , the scheme in [3] and our proposed scheme is [(3t+2)δ]log 2 q bits, [3t 2 +4t+(8t+4)δ]log 2 q bits and [(3t+3)δ)]log 2 q bits, respectively.
Although the broadcast packet size in our proposed scheme is almost the same as that of the scheme in [2] , we will prove later that the total communication cost for updating group session keys and users' personal secrets in our proposed scheme is less than that of other schemes.
Moreover, our proposed scheme has longer lifetime, saving the communication overhead by avoiding resetting the scheme frequently. (3) Lifetime Fig. 2 shows the tradeoff between the size of sliding window, δ, and the maximum allowed number of revoked users, t, for our proposed scheme, where the packet size is 64KB, and q is a 128-bit integer. From Fig. 2 , we observe that when δ=10, at most 135 and 23 revoked users are allowed for the scheme in [2] and the scheme in [3], respectively. However, the allowed number of revoked users is approximately 135 for our proposed scheme. Fig. 3 shows the comparison of the possible lifetime of schemes in [2] , [3] and our proposed scheme, where δ=10 and m=200. From Fig. 3 , we observe that the scheme in [2] is reset at the 66th session, and the scheme in [3] is reset frequently. The reason for this phenomenon is that these schemes follow the "all revocation model". Since our proposed scheme adopts the "partial revocation model", it can always run without being reset.
Hence, our proposed scheme supports a longer lifetime than other two schemes. (4) The total communication cost for updating group For the scheme in [2] , the communication cost for distributing the personal secret to each group member is (2m+2δ-1)log 2 q bits in the initialization phase, and the communication cost for updating group session keys is [(3t′+2)δ]log 2 q bits in the broadcast phase.
[4] C. Blundo After running m′ sessions, the scheme will be reset and new personal secrets should be distributed to each group member. Hence, from the initialization to the first reset, the total communication cost for updating session keys and users' personal secrets is [(3t′+2)δm′+2(2m+2δ-1)]log 2 q bits, where m′ denotes the session number at which the scheme in [2] is reset, and t′ denotes the number of revoked users when the scheme is reset.
In our proposed scheme, the communication cost for distributing personal secrets is 3log 2 q bits, and the communication cost for updating group session keys is [(3t+3)δ]log 2 q bits.
Since our proposed scheme needs not to be reset, it decreases the communication cost for updating personal secrets. Thus, after running m′ sessions, the total communication cost for updating session keys and users' personal secrets is [(3t+3)δ)m′+3]log 2 q bits.
According to simulation results in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 , the decrement of the communication cost for these two schemes is about 2.73KB.
Hence, the total communication cost of our proposed scheme is less than that of other two schemes.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In order to solve the problem of limited life span in previous self-healing group key distribution schemes and reduce the storage and communication costs, we proposed a long-lived δ-self-healing group key distribution scheme in this paper. In our proposed scheme, the personal secret of group members is updated during each session, and a partial revocation is performed. Performance analysis and simulation results show that our proposed scheme could run a longer time without being reset. Moreover, our proposed scheme reduces the storage and communication costs compared to other two previous schemes.
For a self-healing group key distribution scheme, an interesting and challenging problem is how to achieve a better trade-off between the storage cost and the communication cost. As same as previous schemes, the key update broadcast packet in our proposed scheme is still large. We will focus on reducing the communication cost in our future work.
